1.      Argument

The possibility and the necessity to elaborate a Constitution for the new Europe have become a key-matter within the actual political debates, closely related to the claim made by the advocates of a European Union seen as a coherent and unitary politeia. Of course, the motivations for advocating such a Constitution may be different. Some see it as a decisive step towards the so long delayed political unification or as a warranty for consolidating the stability and the role of Europe as a main actor on an international stage marked by what some people called, after the ruin of the post-war bi-polar balance, the "diffusion of power". Federalists entertain the hope that a more efficient institutional organisation free from centralism as well as a democratic differentiation of the decision-making process may lead to a genuinely united European family with mature members individually responsible for their destiny. Other groups of the civil society, partisans of minority groups and of the doctrine of human rights, like many union movements as well, aspire to a an explicitly endorsed and uninterpretable maximisation of the civil and social rights in particular.

As a matter of fact, even the name of "European Constitution" hides contradictions and a certain degree of ambiguity. If some kind of global constitution is needed and to what extent this would not overlap the national constitutions now extant, very different from each other and closely related to a number of particular historical precedents sometimes subject to dispute. It is well-known, for instance, the republicanist dominant of the assumptions proper to the Constitution of the French Republic which, however, is often reproached for not acknowledging explicitly the rights of the national minorities (with the tendency to counterbalance the majority!) or the quasi-royal prerogatives allotted to the President of this Republic. On the other hand, no one clearly knows how a French union militant, ready to intone the Marseillese on any occasion for strike, and the label of subject of Her Majesty, which any officer or leader of a British institution bears, very often with genuine pride, could possibly get along together under the umbrella of a single Constitution. Moreover, the ambiguity is also due to the options still divided between the partisans of different major trends, -- present even within the European Parliament-- between the partisans of an ongoing intergovernmentalism, the moderates who would accept at most a confederate configuration and the ones who would proclaim no later than tomorrow the United States of Europe.

Let us admit the legitimacy of the fear some people entertain as concerns the possibility of affecting the administrative organisation, the peculiarities and stereotypes of the art de vivre of every ethnic or cultural group taken by itself. It is hard to believe that the English or the Scottish will escape their island syndrome next day or that the Normands will replace their traditional calvados with some Ceylon tea taken at no matter what moment of the day, or that the Portuguese will start to build up Finnish saunas in their houses over the night and so on. A more serious matter concerns the existence of powerful mutual reticences regarding the manner of state, territory or administration organisation. The Italian regions, sometimes officially bilingual, no matter how much official autonomy they receive, could not compete with the British financial local autonomy -- Scotland has even its own central bank and its own Parliament -- even if in U.K there are no territorial units conventionally acknowledged by the name of "regions", the languages of the minorities are not cultivated by universities of the minorities and so on. Neither the hundreds of years which have passed since the end of terrible wars between the European peoples have succeeded to completely erase the adversities and particularly the differences in conceiving public and private life, sometimes willingly opposed by the elites on both sides.

2.     Why would we need a European Constitution?

For the moment, we believe, the reason for promoting a European Constitution comes to the establishing of some compact and unitary institutions, up to the challenges tomorrow could bring, as well as of a general framework for a common solving of the matters regarding the coherence and the re-dimensioning of the space for action, responsibility and political representation for all Europeans. Maybe for some this is too much while for others this is too little. What is for certain, however, is the fact that from the point of view of the actual European interest-groups this would be the maximum of democratisation institutionally tolerable by the EU Governments.

Regarding the increase in the number of rights and particularly the perspective from which this increase is made, we do not notice any discontinuance from the post-illuminist and liberalist approach which stays at the basis of the whole European institutional construction. The Constitution would have the merit of offering additional guaranties that no one is discriminated in the active or in the private life, clause which is also to regard the residents on the territory of the European Union. Relating these rights, as it is generally known, with the residence, with their belonging to certain groups and with the juridical statute has been and still is often perceived as restrictive and unable to generate a renewal of the political thought regarding the conceiving of the European citizenship and of the political action in the new European space. The fight for limiting the discriminations is not by itself capable either to regenerate the consistence of the public space or to offer motivations and complexity to the private and intimate domain --using the terminology of Jurgen Habermas-- of the Europeans' lives. Of course, no one could ask from a Constitution, even from a European one, to mediate between individuals and the society or to remodel by itself the public space of the actual Europe. What could be asked, however, is to emphasise not only the listing of some rights on a piece of paper and the juridical hyper-codification, but to revise especially the premises, the principles, the package of recommended values and the allegedly neutral, "objective" perspective of the educational system in order to offer clear and solid bases for educating the future citizens of a politically re-united Europe.

If the main objective to be accomplished remains the fulfillment of the European Idea, then it would be logical for us to focus on the aspects of building up another framework, denser and more equitable, for the European citizenship. Even from this point of view, contradictory approaches are visible -- under the mark and under the pressure of traditions not only once in antagonism - regarding the optimal organisational conception for ensuring this average social framework, favourable to a new European citizenship.

On the one hand, the history of the neo-functionalist construction of the institutional framework in Brussels is strongly marked by what Edgar Morin has called a pyramidal, "corporal-ised vision" over the organisation of the inter-institutional relations and of the relations between institutions and those who give them life. For this reason, the advocates of this "republicanism" which has endured a long process of bureaucratisation/instrumentalisation have never seen as another possible orientation but, in the best case, the legislative codification of the claims of different groups into some formal rights. This legalist instrumentalist orientation threatens to a large extent to make Europe become a "democracy of judges", where finally lawyers are the generalised needed evil. In parallel, the capacity of understanding and access of certain social groups in increasing number to this legalist system is continuously narrowing. This situation is one of the main topics of debate that, on the background of big political corruption scandals, is a cause of hysteria in France from quite a while. At the moment of the foundation of the European Communities, the Germans consented to the neo-functionalist procedure of integration. As long as they felt protected by the high degree of decisional autonomy of the lands, against the background of collective guilt which they have assumed, the neo-corporatist dominant of the German society has not been very long uneasy with the "democratic deficit" in Brussels. It could still be said that the French-German axis has the initiative and may win with regard to the destruction of their collective identities and of the structures moulded during centuries in their societies.

On the other hand, in the minimalist conception of the institutions, the liberal instinct, the development of subsidiarity, different forms of "progressive conservatism" sometimes, - as this occurs in the societies in Great Britain and in the Scandinavian States - will have difficulties in admitting a complete or quasi-complete yielding of the prerogatives of national sovereignty, if the possibility to exert their own forms of participation to the European diversity will not be ensured. Probably, if the EU Member States had allowed a less obliging dialogue with the Candidate States, the debate on the adoption of the European Constitution would have become more complicated but also more complex, likely to push the scale of the balance to an unpredictable option. The maintaining of the "democratic deficit" between the role of the Council of Ministers or of the Commission, on the one hand, and the European Parliament, on the other, scares the Eastern people or, more exactly, the Central Europeans of today less than the slowness or the decisional deadlock, especially as compared to the quickness of the changes in Russia or to the degradation of the economic and political situation in the former Soviet republics like Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova.

In fact, the crisis situation of the coagulation of the public space on both sides of the former Iron Curtain represents, -- as almost all important analysts of the European construction pointed out -- the deep cause of the decisional confusion and of the weak European responsibilisation in the face of the challenges and threats which assault it. In this stage, the challenges have as a source rather the internal delays, differences and unhonoured liabilities than the traditional external enemies. After the Western elites have oriented in the 60's-70's their own societies towards a stimulation of the consumption, it is extremely difficult for them now to exact any kind of sacrifices or to mobilise the public opinion by invoking the cause of the united Europe. The symptom of the retreat towards its own family or, even more, towards the sheer satisfaction of the individual desires allows less and less a political discourse in the name of the great European causes or of the Nation States. By examining the results of the public surveys in EU, one could immediately see that the extending of the organisation is far from being felt as a priority, when it is not altogether rejected as an unpermitted luxury. At the other extreme, the Swiss and the Norwegians have rejected several times the accession to EU, not out of feelings of frustration, but due to the fact that the guaranties for their need of citizenship respected by authorities could diminish instead of being consolidated as a civic foundation for their own representation over the public space and over their European options in a wide sense. Paradoxically or not, we could say that the sheer participation to the Free Trade Area is sufficient or more convenient than the assumption of the juridical and supra-governmental obligations that the full accession to EU induces. In many cases, even the forms of civism in their countries seem to them more consistent and more unitary than what happens in the EU space.

Returning to the problem of the constitutional framework favourable to the embracing of a full European citizenship, it seems pretty clear that the debate or the majority of the proposals points to the official introduction or maximisation of certain rights, already partially certified. Too little is said about the capacity of many citizens to literally enjoy the existing ones at least. Moreover, the trends generated in EU go to a deeper and deeper apathy as related to the internal electoral process, to the elections for the European Parliament, referendums or any other forms of the political life in general. The democratic participation is restrained more and more to the vote in the local elections.

In these circumstances, it seems obvious that a European Constitution would be the firs called to know of and to explain the means for stimulating the public/private interest, the principles, the values, the historical efforts and the practical importance of improving the European institutions. Without, at least, an average understanding of these bases and consequences, the expectation of a unitary involvement of the citizens towards the construction of a united Europe seems a pure utopia. In this context, the superiority of EU would deserve to be explicitly defined in all details and the chances offered by the deepening of the less obvious dimensions of a certified European citizenship, but especially supported to manifest themselves, would deserve to be widely clarified. If we do not wish this European Constitution to be a simple proclamation or a neutral legal instrument, but to actually refocus the political discourse and the putting into practice of the public policies and principles of the new Europe around itself, then it is necessary to surpass the quantitative and factual approach over the role and the opportunities of the citizens to influence the decisions over EU. Such an orientation does not assume at all emotional approaches, but a restructuring of the argumentation and of the principles of the dialogue in the decision-making process concerning Europe as a protagonist on the international arena.

The manner in which the face of the new more democratic Europe is to be institutionalised remains an essential aspect of the whole matter. A decisive step for passing to what professor Pierre Rosanvalon has called a deliberative democracy at a European level is supposed to be, briefly, the distribution of the responsibilities within the European Parliament and the formation of a Chamber of Citizens beside a Chamber with the role of representing the governments of the member countries. Moreover, the elimination of the ambiguities related to the functions of the European Commission would allow the establishing of a genuine European Government. Finally, it is also mentioned the possibility of founding a European Court of Justice with prerogatives over a European criminal law system as well as a Constitutional and Administrative Court as genuine jurisdictional organisms. Many European politicians at a national level fear that as soon as these reforms are put into practice, they will be pushed aside with regard to their influence and decisional role and their own existence will be questioned.

Beyond this kind of doubts and reserves, there is still actual the question regarding the manner and the extent to which those transformations will lead to more than a bureaucratic reorientation, a re-centralising in Brussels and, in the end, a conservation of the same dominants belying under a changed appearance. A federalist orientation of Europe must assume by all means an increase of the degree of autonomy, initiative and responsibility of the communities and of the citizens who belong to them. The establishing of a more flexible and more refined institutional foundation for elaborating decisions and public policies will be in favour of the unity and of the prestige Europe has by its word. It is up to us to acquire the appetite to prepare ourselves for building and using it avoiding the overlaps of competences and the false controversies.

Of course, this European Constitution is crucial as a guidance-supreme law. However, the expected effect could not be accomplished but by a package of deep reforms at all levels of development and strategic organisation. Let us briefly mention them:

1. Constructing a dynamic balance between the freedom, the prosperity of the Unique European Market and the European social and civic rights:

The sharpening of the market competition in the world or the so-called pressure of economic and financial globalisation would deserve to stimulate an innovative strategy at the European level. This strategy would allow solving the spurious dilemma/dispute between mutilating the identities by the blind tyranny of the market logic and the freedom of cultivating one’s own thinking, most often already reduced to an ethnographic and vestigial dominant component. For any lucid mind, it is clear that the future European economy cannot avoid the effects of the globalisation process without appeal to a Unique Plan, that is without assuming the sacrifice of the liberty of initiative and action for the enterpriser but rather assuming the adoption of a coherent and well-organised economic strategy. Nevertheless, what Europe has to say will really matter for the next century at the global level only to the extent to which the European economic giant will succeed to change the well-rooted mentalities concerning the position and the ethos of work and imposing gradually viable economic and social alternatives to the reductionist concept of continuous economic growth at any price -- of the "sustainable development" kind. In other words, only deepening the economic integration together with a political reorganisation and a civic remobilization of all regions of the continent would help it resist the tight competition and the influence of other important power-centres in the world.

2. Simplifying and accelerating the decision-taking process at the level of the Council of Ministers and the other European institutions depending on the assessment of the internal reform:

Together with the desirably rapid increase in the number of EU Members, extending the vote by qualified majority and even by assuming the simple majority -- when unblocking a potentially explosive situation is absolutely compulsory -- within the debates of the Council of Ministers and the European Council becomes a key-element of the internal institutional reform.

It is also of much importance the reform and extension of the decisional role of the European Parliament and of a stable Presidency of EU with an extended mandate after a previous internal reform and a simplification of the bureaucracy. In this context, an increase of the reflexive public transparency concerning the decision process of the EU institutions and the accession criteria for the new Candidate States, thanks to a monitorisation by the EU Council of the Sage, would deserve to become a priority.

3. The urgency of rapid integration of all States which have signed Membership Agreements with EU:

Considering generally the slow rhythm of adaptation of the ex-communist to the economic, legislative and administrative conditions and standards of EU, in order not to deepen or create new rents of development between themselves or between them and the the communitary countries, conferring a Status of EU Political Member would serve both the necessity of monitorisation by the European Council, the imposition of a "discipline" the candidates have already consented to and the stimulation of their own internal reforms as concerns the associated countries. In the same time, establishing this type of affiliation to EU would represent a solemn commitment of support from the Presidency of EU on the basis of a permanent strict assessment of their democratic achievements towards a subsequent determination of the proper moment for economic and social integration.

4. The necessity to define and institutionalise rigorously the lobby procedures and the Consultative Status for the major non-governmental institutions by the European institutions with a decision role:

Involving the Member-States and the European transnational interest groups in the process of institutional reforms of EU would give way to the current use with a convenient degree of transparency of some mechanisms of permanent consulting and information and of rigorous institutionalisation of the lobby procedures for them by the Commission -- or the future European Government -- the Parliament and the Presidency of EU. In this direction the means offered by the Economic or Social Council or the Committee of the Regions could contribute more to the process of fundamenting the decisions the European Government should adopt in the future, Government whose volume of work will be in continuous increase.

It could also be mentioned here the imposition and stimulation of the role of credible representatives for the civic societies in EU and the Candidate-States in the monitorisation and continual assessment of the results of the process of economic and social integration in the accession negotiations in co-operation with and warranted by the new reformed European Presidency and the European Parliament. Related to this point the future EU Treaty could establish for the European NGOs active in different fields of the harmonisation process a consultative/association Status similar to that offered by the Council of Europe or UNESCO to representative NGOs.

5. Promoting a realistic and unitary security concept for the new Europe

This desideratum for which there is, at least in principle, a large consensus, would assume renouncing the spurious dilemma which makes the problem move between consenting to the dependence on the USA protection shield and ensuring a European identity emancipated as regards security and defence policies. The current degree of globalisation of the potential threats and conflicts makes manifest, in fact, a better co-ordination of the policies in this field between the partners on the two shores of the Atlantic by mechanisms of mutual assistance established by permanent consulting and co-operation between the military heads of EU (a "Euro-Corp" really developed and capable to become autonomous) and the NATO Integrated Command Board, especially in critical situations of military conflict or danger for the common security. In this context, the Council of Europe would constitute the filter and deontologic guide for the active policies of preventing and administrating the conflicts and crises which could constitute a threat for the ideals and objectives of the whole Europe. It is clear for everyone that Europe should not depend exclusively on USA. Only for putting into practice a co-operation on the same par with it would be necessary to formulate an external and security policy, at least concerning major problems, and the expression of a unitary firm political will, especially in the context of conflicts and crises with an international impact. Only by promoting such a unique European policy and adopting the attitude of EU regarding the appearance of new migratory waves towards Europe it is possible to avoid the "besieged fortress" syndrome.

6. Refounding the European educational system in view of forging an enriched common identity:

In a Europe which assumes the principles of an organisation of federalist type it would be compulsory to rethink and refound the whole educational system on the co-ordinates of cultivating the universal values, pluralism/coexistence of various conceptions on the Good and the Evil (cf. Hanna Arendt), interculturality and laicity. This would be the premise necessary to design a new veritable common European identity to fight growing xenophobia, racism, intolerance or "Euro-scepticism", respecting not only formalistically the diversity of ethno-cultural sensitivities and characteristics non-violently experienced.

 

 Romania seems to be too disadvantaged by its incapacity to put into practice satisfactorily its own internal commitments and desiderata for being able to claim more than a temporary role in the present stage of the process of rethinking the extended European development. In almost all fundamental analyses certain dominant ideas recur which attest the fragility – for using an euphemism - of the results of the reform process for the Romanian society:

1. the absence of a general and coherent model of social-economic development which marks clearly the priorities and coagulate the main energy in view of deepening an explicit europenisation trend at the scale of mentalities, premises/strategies to be adopted for the future social, political and economical reforms;
2. maintaining a risky overlap of a retreat towards the inner self (auto-sufficiency) of the dominant mentalities of the public sphere, on the one hand, and the superficiality of the openings to communicate with the exterior, solved mainly mimetically or snobbishly;
3. the dramatic aggravation of the economic and social polarisation which makes the governments and the political class of Romania resemble more and more the unpopular regimes in Central America rather than the rest of Europe;
4. the inconsistency and anaemia of the pragmatic approaches as regards the solving of different forms of internal crisis which brings about gradually a dissolution of the authority of the State in several fields of competence and the impossibility to train and make responsible certain pro-European elites;
5. the hardly controllable speeding of the of bad timings in the regional development and un-balances intra and inter-sectorial;
6. the persistence of an interdependence with an already quasi-poisoned ground between a deep crisis of the public values/morality and one of the institutions of the society which could bring about going out of the network of remaking and reassuming its European vocation;
7. the inertia and passivity of the reactions of the civic society and mass-media regarding the recurrent attempts at the integrity and continuity of the internal democratisation, reduced not only once to the role of decorative or export factors for the legitimacy of the Romanian officials.

Unfortunately, as it may be noticed, these forms of crisis, exceed by far the technical screening the European Commission does periodically concerning Romania. The mentioned Commission limits itself to notice the effects of the consequences the accumulation of the anomalies noticed above. The confrontation between the registers no matter how large of the acquis communautaire and the legislative changes, including those adopted after years of pressures and efforts, cannot constitute a tool sufficiently effective for stimulating the rhythm of internal sector transformation and even less a catalyser for the process much more complex of refounding the society as a whole.

Compared to the mentioned models, it is obvious a responsible Government, interested in an improvement and an acceleration of the decisions referring to European unification by the extension of EU should favour a radical scenario of evolution for the European construction. Romania, in particular, would deserve to take an active part towards obtaining a political type of affiliation to EU. This would bring the whole society in a mobilisation for profound changes which would lead to greater responsibilities, reform activities more strictly assessed by the Romanian government. In the same time, Romania’s voice could be better heard during the debates over the common European future and the results of the preparation process for full accession would became visible sooner, especially in their positive dimension for the citizens. A large part of the present political demagogy concerning the risks of losing the national sovereignty, ethnical segregation, territorial secession, colonial marginalisation of Romanian by an international plot would lose in this way from its virulence and legitimacy.

A pro-European and reformist rule-of-law governing would thus exploit the lane offered by an earlier settlement of the present European institutional crisis, in the sense of assuming the federalist trend of Europe by:

• Eliminating many prejudices aggressively agitated and the ambiguity/liability in the legislative area as regards the property, the foreign investments, the economic restructuring;
• Resettle the social hierarchies, especially the selection criteria for the elites, on the basis of their deserts, competences and morality by putting away the forms of pressure and blackmail of the former political police over taking key-decisions in the society;
• Inter-communication, transparency and realistic dialogue between the state and the civic society, without accepting open ideological intrusions of the Orthodox Church in the decisions of the state;
• Administrative decentralisation, depolitisation and professional forming at the level of the central and local authorities; effective control of observing the legislation especially in the fields making the concern of EU;
• Fighting legislatively and procedurally, not repressively against corruption in manner liable to quantification, removing from their leading positions in ministries or other institutions of the State the persons who committed serious abuses during the communist regime;
• Promoting the development and the policies of regional harmonisation; ensuring a real equality of social and professional chances for all citizens, without the present discriminations, covered or open.

The luxury of dwelling on variants of minimal compromise and simulated obedience to the conditions expressed by EU becomes harder and harder to justify and maintain economically by Romania. However, only to the extent to which the European Commission decides to give course to guidance, conditioning and rigorous monitorisation of the effective progresses/results in each field of the preparation for integration, we could speak about a chance of credible improvement of the situation of our country and its placing on the orbit of a plausible and feasible European integration.

For achieving such an objective, officially promoted both by the Romanian authorities and by the Presidency of EU, it is vital to assume a loyal partnership relation which shouldn’t exclude at all a severe tutorship from the Union, a free-consented role of disciple from Romania as well as an auto-generated availability permanently motivated by the appearance of a space of common fundamental values towards the achievement of an irreversible European unification and consolidation .

4.     To what extent is Romania prepared for a European Constitution?

We should acknowledge that -- due to historical considerations, to the ambiguous orientation and to the incapacity to put into practice the announced reforms -- the European Constitution is not and could not be a main topic of debate for the Romanian society. Most of the Romanians are taken up either with the race of biological surviving or with the chase after living at the level of the Western democracies without practising, however, the models of development that made possible the stability and the affluence of today. It has also been missing -- and no sign of it has shown up yet -- a coherent strategy of the political elites with the aim of surpassing the deadlock Romania faces today.

Besides, due to the absence of some visible results of the EU support to the national economy, -- of which many citizens have dreamed -- the degree of trust in the possibility of operating radical changes in the society is going down to individual retreats and to a counter-productive fatalism. As such, it is no surprise Romania is the only one without a genuine civil pro-European movement, without organisations with a genuine federalist perspective etc.

At this moment, at the initiative of the National Liberal Party, a fairly large project of constitutional reform is in course of negotiation with the leading party (PDSR - a left conservatist party). This aims, essentially, at transforming the regime in Romania from a half-presidential republic (with ambiguous presidential attributes in many situations) into a parliamentary republic, at the specialisation of the two Chambers of the Parliament, the modification of the vote system, possibly of the law of organisation and funding of the parties with stricter norms, of the range of application for parliamentary immunity, of the competence attributed to the juridical power. These measures could genuinely contribute to the modernisation of the manner of organising the political regime in Romania, if they are not, like many other previous institutional and legislative reforms, simple cosmetics. On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary that these reforms should be thought from the outset close to and under the inspiration of the pillars that the EU treaties represent, convergent with the pro-federalist direction to which the European organism is slowly moving. From the information put at the disposal of the public by the initiators, it does not clearly result the modelling vector we have mentioned above. A State formally retreating from economy in a period of confusion and structural corruption could not convince anyone to invest in Romania, investment which is one of the few chances for redressing the country. Besides, the coexistence of such reform measures with other ones which do not clarify, for instance, the statute of the private property neither in industry and agriculture nor over the individual buildings and fields increases the stupefaction of EU concerning Romania and makes the fluidity of the process as a whole more and more difficult.

5.     Final remarks

Unfortunately, the conclusions of this research paper cannot be too optimistic. We can not speak in Romania of too much enthusiasm in favour of the European cause, widely perceived as a package of opportunities accessible only to affluent payers. Although the national elites have enjoyed many programs and facilities they had never hoped under communism, one could not say that their priority has been that of actually compensating for the access to these opportunities offered by the EU Members. And the most appropriate manner of making up to them would have been that of explaining and honestly using those advantages as well as of assuming the necessary give-ups in order to give Romania the chance of becoming one day a Member State with full rights.

The most vulnerable point in Romania’s candidature remains, however, the critical contrast between political declarations and the capacity to accomplish its commitments, to manage coherent reforms in the main sectors. Only by creating institutions of a European type and taking care of the political facades is not enough for leading to an orientation, a rhythm and to solid foundations capable to connect Romania to the European standards, exigencies, criteria and modalities of work.

So long, EU has avoided to involve itself in a manner liable to offend somehow the sovereignty aspirations of the Candidate-States. Nevertheless this led to long delays and much suffering, at least in the case of the former Yugoslavia republics. It is desirable that in the special case of Romania, the Europeans should not wait again for a new major crisis before intervening decisively. The complexity of the situation requires from EU, public acknowledgement of the immaturity of the democratisation process in Romania and more substantial involvement, even without expecting the governants, whichever they would be, to expressly ask for that.

To the extent to which the European leaders still think of Romania as a part of the European culture and civilization, they should not disconsider the delay of the process for preparation in view of Romania’s accession to EU.

Likewise, after the last cold shower of the elections in 2000 which brought to the accession of extremism to the Parliament, the last chance remains an involvement of the youth, of course, only if more possibilities of access to decision and to political participation will be offered to them.

Extract from "One single Constitution for the EU", Coord. Professor Heiner Timmermann, European Academy in Otzenhausen, Leske - Budrich Verlag in Opladen, Germany, 2001.

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